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DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL LAW: 2006
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT
CRIMINAL LAW: 2006
BY TIMOTHY H. EVERETT*
This article reviews some of the issues in criminal cases
decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court and the
Connecticut Appellate Court in 2006.' While no case gar-
nered the popular attention given the Michael Ross case in
2005, the courts laid important groundwork in cases dealing
with the definition of criminal law and its retroactive appli-
cation, the reviewability of unpreserved claims of constitu-
tional error, the impact of the code of evidence on the judi-
ciary's common-law authority, the standard of harmfulness
for evidentiary review, and the relation between hearsay and
the confrontation clause. Five appellate cases particularly
stand out: State v. Skakel, State v. Brunetti, State v. Sawyer,
State v. Scruggs, and State v. Kirby. Each is discussed in its
own section, along with mention of other cases that present-
ed similar issues. The rest of the article reviews some of the
other interesting criminal cases decided in 2006.
I. TURNING BACK THE CLOCK: STATE V. SKAKEL
In State v. Skakel,2 the Supreme Court affirmed the state's
successful murder prosecution of defendant, a 40-year-old
adult, for a homicide committed in 1975 when he was a 15-
year-old juvenile. In so doing the court grappled with thorny
issues concerning the applicability of the juvenile and crim-
inal law of 1975 to a prosecution begun in 2000. The defen-
dant raised seven claims of error on appeal, chief among
which were: that his case had been improperly transferred
from the juvenile court docket to the adult criminal docket;
that the prosecution was brought outside the statute of limi-
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
I The Supreme Court decided 35 criminal and habeas corpus appeals by full
opinion, with 6 dissenting and 8 concurring opinions. The Appellate Court decided
a staggering 186 criminal and habeas corpus appeals by full opinion (and many
more by "Memorandum Decisions"), with 7 dissenting and 5 concurring opinions.
2 276 Conn. 633, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 578 (2006). The defendant currently
is pursuing a petition for a new trial pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-270. Skakel
v. State, CV-05-4006524.
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tations; that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in pretri-
al discovery and at final argument; and that the trial court
erred in various constitutional and evidentiary rulings on the
admissibility of evidence. 3
The first major issue addressed by the Skakel court was
application of the juvenile transfer law of 1975 to a juvenile-
become-an-adult in the 25 years that passed before the state
commenced its prosecution. How does the law treat an accused
who has outgrown the protected status 4 that he might have
enjoyed if arrested when still a 15-year-old juvenile? The
court found that the transfer of the case from juvenile court to
the adult criminal docket was proper despite noncompliance
with certain mandates in General Statutes Sections 17-60a and
17-66 (rev. 1975). The probation investigation prior to trans-
fer omitted the statutorily required "examination of the
'parentage and surroundings of the child, his age, habits, and
history, and.., also an inquiry into the home conditions, habits
and character of his parents or guardians."' 5 The court found
such statutory noncompliance to be harmless, given that the
statute's purpose, to consider whether there existed alternative
state facilities for the juvenile "in preference to the facilities
otherwise available for the treatment and punishment of adult
offenders," was not accomplishable for a 40-year-old defen-
dant, long out of childhood.6 The court also rejected the defen-
dant's claim that it was error to apply transfer regulations cur-
rent in 2000 instead of 1975 state regulations that had permit-
ted alternative placements for persons over 18.7
3 The belated prosecution beginning in 2000 captured the attention of public
and press for various reasons: the defendant is a first cousin in the Kennedy clan of
political fame, the homicide was an "unsolved mystery" for a quarter century, the
defendant and the victim were children of affluence in Greenwich, and every aspect
of the case presented a problematic exercise in reconstruction of the past, factually
and legally, for the witnesses, lawyers, and courts involved in the trial and appeal.
4 The Skakel court indicated that a person's legal interest in his juvenile status,
which carries with it adjudication as a juvenile instead of criminal prosecution as an
adult, is a liberty interest that "derives from, and is limited by, the statutory provi-
sions governing the transfer, adjudication and commitment of juveniles." 276 Conn.
at 658.
5 276 Conn. at 659.
6 276 Conn. at 660.
7 The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the 1975 law "'narrowly
focus[es] on the availability and suitability of state institutions "designed for the
care and treatment of children" to which the juvenile court has authority to "com-
mit such child."' (Emphasis added.)." 276 Conn. at 661-62.
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The second major holding in Skakel was that the prosecu-
tion of the defendant was not barred by the five-year statute
of limitations, Gen. Stat. §54-193 (rev. 1975), despite on-
point precedent from 1983, State v. Paradise,8 in which the
court had held that the five-year statute of limitations applied
to murders committed in 1975 and that the legislature's
repeal of the statute of limitations for murder in 1976 applied
only prospectively. 9 In Skakel the state argued that the court
should overrule Paradise and repudiate its underlying prem-
ise that a change in a statute of limitation is presumed not to
apply retroactively. The Skakel court agreed with the state:
Upon reconsideration, we are persuaded that Paradise was
wrongly decided. In particular, we conclude that we were
misguided in establishing a presumption that, in the absence
of a contrary indication of legislative intent, an amendment to
a criminal statute of limitations is not to be applied retroac-
tively. . . . [W]e are convinced that, with respect to those
offenses for which the preamendment limitation period has
not expired, it is far more likely that the legislature intended
for the amended limitation period to apply to those offenses.
In view of the fact that the five year limitation period of the
pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 had not expired
with respect to the October, 1975 murder of the victim when
the 1976 amendment to that statutory provision became
effective, we conclude that P.A. 76-35, § 1, is the operative
statute of limitations for purposes of this case. 10
The precedential value of the statute of limitations holding
in Skakel might, on first consideration, appear limited since
few persons in the future are apt to be prosecuted for a mur-
der committed prior to the 1976 amendment of the statute of
limitations that is now understood to have retroactive, not
just prospective, application. But the Skakel court announced
an important, broader rule of statutory interpretation:
8 State v. Paradise, 189 Conn. 346, 350 (1983).
9 The trial court in Skakel had denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on
grounds not adopted by the Supreme Court, finding Paradise had been already been
overruled implicitly by later decisions of the Supreme Court, State v. Ellis, 197
Conn. 436,460 (1985), and State v. Golino, 201 Conn. 435,438-39 (1986). See 276
Conn. at 664-65 n.30. While the Skakel court reached the same result as the trial
court, it did not adopt the trial court's view that Paradise had already been overruled
by Ellis and Golino. 276 Conn. at 665 n.30. Justice Katz, concurring, did employ
the trial court's reasoning. Id. at 770.
10 276 Conn. at 666-67. See also, id. at 693.
2007]1
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changes in statutes of limitations laws are to be understood as
"presumptively retroactive""1 as long as the limitations peri-
od has not expired before the statutory change.] 2 The court
noted that "[i]n Paradise, we did not explain our conclusion
that §54-193 is penal in nature, and therefore that that provi-
sion must be strictly construed."'13 The Skakel court held that
the rule of strict construction of criminal statut6s does not
apply to statutes of limitation because a "statutory limitation
period has nothing to do with the scope or reach of the sub-
stantive offense"'14 and "because criminal statutes of limita-
tion do not define criminal conduct, establish the punishment
to be imposed or otherwise burden defendants, such statutes
are not truly penal at all."15
The Skakel court stated that its decision resolved "a ten-
sion between our mode of analysis in Paradise and the
approach to the construction of statutes in the criminal realm
that we have employed more recently" under which "provi-
sions that, although a part of our system of criminal laws,
nevertheless carry a presumption of retroactivity."' 16 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Katz agreed with the majority
holding that Paradise should be reversed, but on alternate
grounds. 17 In her view, Paradise was miscast as a retroac-
tivity case in the first place.' 8 Reviewing the history of mur-
II Id. at 674.
12 Id. at 681-83 (Ex Post Facto prohibition bars retroactive application of new
statute of limitations to already time-barred prosecution; id. at 681 n. 45, citing, inter
alia, Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003)).
13 Id. at 676.
14 Id. at 675.
15 Id. at 676.
16 Id. at 689-90. The presumption of retroactivity may be overcome by express
statutory language. See State v. George J., 280 Conn. 551, 561-62 n. 6 (2006) (cit-
ing Skakel). Consistent with Skakel, the rule of lenity played no role in the court's
interpretation of the statute of limitations issue in George J., where the court decid-
ed that DCF notification of police on behalf of a child in its custody was not "vic-
tim notification" so as to trigger the applicable five-year statute of limitations, which
dates from the time that the victim notifies the police. Critical to its calculation of
the five-year bar, the court held that the statute was not triggered until four days after
DCF notification when the actual victim met with police to be interviewed. Id. at
664-71. The court acknowledged that the word "victim" in other legal contexts
includes a victim's parents or legal representative, but the court held that such a
broad gloss on the term would defeat the legislative purpose of the statute of limita-
tions governing prosecutions for sex crimes. Id. at 569-70.
17 Id. at 770-82.
18 Id. at 771-72.
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der under the common law and the Penal Code, Katz found
an unexamined premise in Paradise that was false: "the
crime of murder was not subject to the statute of limitations
in effect in 1975, and, indeed, there never has been a limita-
tions period on the prosecution of murder."19
II. UNDERDEVELOPED RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT
GOLDING REVIEW: STATE V. BRUNETTI (H)
In State v. Brunetti ("Brunetti (II)"20), an en banc panel of
the Supreme Court issued a 4-3 decision affirming the defen-
dant's conviction of murder. Brunetti (II) superseded the
court's 3-2 decision issued in 2005 that had reversed the
defendant's murder conviction ("Brunetti (1)").21 The
changed outcome reflects the Brunetti (II) majority's conclu-
sion that the search and seizure argument upon which the
defendant had prevailed in Brunetti (I) could not be reached
on the merits because the trial record was not adequate to
support review under the doctrine of State v. Golding,22
which established the test that governs appellate review of
unpreserved constitutional claims. 23
In Brunetti (I) a plurality of the court had held that a "con-
sent search" of the defendant's home which he shared with
his parents had violated the state constitution because the
police obtained consent from the defendant's father but were
denied consent by the defendant's mother.2 4 Brunetti (I) was
'9 Id. at 770.
20 279 Conn. 39 (2006), cert. denied, Brunetti v. Connecticut, 2007 U.S. LEXIS
2164 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007).
21 State v. Brunetti, 276 Conn. 40 (2005). "Brunetti (I)" was featured in last
year's Criminal Law Year in Review. T.H. Everett, Developments in Connecticut
Criminal Law: 2005, 80 CONN. BAR J. 185, 186-90 (2005).
22 State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 (1989).
23 The Golding court announced a four-part test: "a defendant can prevail on a
claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following condi-
tions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;
(3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defen-
dant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed
to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim
will fail." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Golding, 213 Conn. at 239-40. See
Brunetti (II), 279 Conn. at 42 n. 1.
24 Brunetti (I) also held that the defendant's motion to suppress his statements to
police as fruits of the "consent" search of his home should have been granted. The
20071
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especially interesting because Justice Katz concurred in the
result on federal constitutional grounds that presaged the
United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Georgia v. Randolph.25 In Brunetti (I), Justice Palmer had
strongly dissented, 26 arguing that the record was inadequate
to support review under State v. Golding.
In Brunetti (II), Justice Palmer's analysis prevailed and
the court held that the record for review was inadequate to
sustain review under Golding. The court described the ten-
sion between the need to raise a claim at trial so that it may
be addressed then and the need to avail defendants of a rem-
edy on appeal for constitutional error that is evident in the
record. 27  The Brunetti (II) court affirmed the vitality of
Golding review, but emphasized that an adequate record is
the sine qua non of such appellate review. 28
The majority in Brunetti (II) held that it was inappropriate
to use the court's appellate authority to review the defen-
dant's gloss on consent search doctrine for two reasons: (1)
the record did not clearly establish whether the defendant's
mother had in fact disagreed with her husband's decision to
consent to a police search of their home; and (2) the defen-
dant in the trial court had not claimed that a husband's con-
sent to search was legally deficient in the absence of express
concurrence from his wife when present. The court found
defendant was in police custody when the consent search was executed. The state
conceded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant until after the
search of his home produced physical evidence of the murder, with which the police
confronted the defendant before interrogating him. 276 Conn. at 65, 83-86.
25 Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006). See Developments in
Connecticut Criminal Law: 2005, 80 CONN. B. J. at 187-90 (discussing Katz con-
currence and Randolph).
26 276 Conn. at 86-143 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
27 Justice Palmer wrote: "Golding is a narrow exception to the general rule that
an appellate court will not entertain a claim that has not been raised in the trial court.
The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that
has not been raised at trial-after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party
to address the claim-would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both
the trial court and the opposing party. Nevertheless, because constitutional claims
implicate fundamental rights, it also would be unfair automatically and categorical-
ly to bar a defendant from raising a meritorious constitutional claim that warrants a
new trial solely because the defendant failed to identify the violation at trial.
Golding strikes an appropriate balance between these competing interests: the
defendant may raise such a constitutional claim on appeal, and the appellate tribu-
nal will review it, but only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate review."
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.). 279 Conn. at 55.
28 Id. at 55 n.27.
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that the defendant's mother's refusal to sign a consent to
search form did not necessarily mean that she objected to the
police search. The undeveloped trial record made it impossi-
ble on appeal to disambiguate the meaning of her conduct:
Because the mother's actions relating to the consent to search
were not at issue at the suppression hearing-the defendant
had claimed only that his father had not given valid consent
to search and, in fact, expressly had indicated that the moth-
er's consent was not necessary-the state had no reason to
present any evidence regarding the mother's consent or lack
thereof, and consequently, it did not do so. As a result, we
simply do not know any of the other circumstances sur-
rounding the mother's refusal to sign the consent to search
form .29
The Brunetti I court held that the trial court's "passing
observation that the defendant's mother 'had declined to con-
sent to [the] search"' was not a sustainable finding because it
"goes well beyond the record" in that the mother's actions
had not been in issue at the suppression hearing. 30
Now writing in dissent, Justice Katz, joined by Chief
Justice Sullivan and Justice Vertefeuille, deemed the record
adequate both to support Golding review31 and to require
reversal based on the Supreme Court's holding in Georgia v.
Randolph.32 In dicta, Justice Palmer for the majority argued
that Randolph was distinguishable on the merits. 33
III. BAD HOUSEKEEPING ALONE NOT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE:
STATE V. SCRUGGS
The Supreme Court again this past year decided an impor-
tant case involving prosecution under the "situation portion" 34
29 (Emphasis in original). Id. at 57-58.
30 Id. at 62-63 & n. 34.
31 279 Conn. at 87 n.1 (incorporating by reference the reasons given in Katz's
concurring opinion in Brunetti (1), 276 Conn. at 68-74).
32 Id. at 87-89.
33 Justice Palmer wrote: "In Randolph, however, the United States Supreme
Court merely held that, for purposes of the federal constitution, 'a warrantless search
of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physical-
ly present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of con-
sent given to the police by another resident.' (Emphasis added.) Id., 1526. Indeed,
Randolph expressly declined to decide the very question raised by this appeal, name-
ly, 'the constitutionality of ... a search as to [an absent] third tenant against whom
the government wishes to use evidence seized after a search with consent from one
co-tenant subject to the contemporaneous objection of another.' (Emphasis added.)
Id., 1526-27 n.8." Brunetti (11), 279 Conn. at 64 n.37.
20071
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of the risk of injury to a child statute, General Statutes Section
53-21(a)(1). In State v. Scruggs, the court reversed the state's
conviction of a mother for maintaining a "cluttered and
unclean residence" 35 that imperiled the mental health of her
12-year-old son.36 The son committed suicide a week after the
Department of Children and Families, which had recently
inspected the conditions at his home, closed out its investiga-
tion of the troubled young boy's situation at school and home.
The trial court rejected the defendant's post-verdict motion
for judgment of acquittal, noting that there had been sufficient
evidence of unhealthy living conditions at home and that a lay
jury had no need for expert testimony to determine the risk to
the decedent's mental health created by his living in such con-
ditions.37 On appeal the defendant claimed that Section 53-
21(a)(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to her
because the statute "provides no notice that poor housekeep-
ing may be a criminal offense" and she also claimed that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction in the
absence of expert testimony to provide the jury with "a basis
upon which to conclude that the conditions in her apartment
were likely to cause a mental health injury to a child."38 Chief
34 See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 148 (2005) (danger of child ingesting
marijuana kept in home); State v. Smith, 273 Conn. 204 (2005) (rock cocaine in
child's home); T.H. Everett, Developments in Criminal Law: 2005, 80 CONN. B.J. at
210-11 (discussing Padua and Smith).
35 The evidence showed that the family apartment was a "a home with a foul
and offensive odor" that was "very messy and cluttered" and had "only an eighteen
inch path between piles of debris from the front door to the kitchen" and provided
"no clear surface in the kitchen to prepare or eat food." Id. at 703-06.
36 Id. at 700-01.
37 The trial court wrote: "'There were few places where Daniel could walk with-
out stepping on clothing or debris. [The] [b]athtub and toilet were filthy, and the
bathroom provided no privacy for cleaning himself. He went to school smelling bad.
The only refuge for this troubled child, beset by bullies at school and fearful at
home, was a closet. Even there, he felt unsafe. This is not a case about a messy
house. No law of which this court is aware regulates the frequency of vacuuming or
prescribes specific housekeeping practices. The law, however, does seek to protect
children .... The evidence here went far beyond messy or disorderly living condi-
tions. The evidence showed extreme clutter and pervasive odor throughout the home,
unsanitary bathroom facilities, and a child whose obvious emotional distress mani-
fested itself in severe hygiene problems. It did not take an expert for this jury to con-
clude that the home living environment was likely to injure the mental, psychologi-
cal, and emotional health of this troubled and fragile child."' (Emphasis added). Id.
at 707.
38 Id. at 708.
[Vol. 81
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Justice Sullivan's opinion for a unanimous court upheld the
defendant's claims, calling them "inextricably intertwined." 39
At trial the state took the position that the prosecution for
risk of injury was not based on the precarious mental health
of the defendant's son40 but rather on the objective proposi-
tion that living conditions in the defendant's apartment would
injure any child,4 1 not just one whose mental health was pre-
carious. 42 Reasoning that it would be trial by "ambuscade" to
permit the state on appeal to deviate from the objective theo-
ry of statutory liability upon which it had proceeded at trial,
the Supreme Court chose to "apply an objective standard in
addressing the defendant's [appellate] claim that she had no
notice that the conditions in her apartment fell within the
scope of §53-21(a)(1)." 43  Employing that objective stan-
dard,44 the court declared the statute "unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the defendant's conduct."45  The court
noted that "experts in child safety who had knowledge of the
39 Id. at 708.
40 In denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court
ruled that the jury could rely on evidence of "'the precarious emotional state of the
specific child actually living in these conditions in determining whether the condi-
tions were likely to injury his health."' Id. at 718. The Supreme Court noted that the
trial court "did not explain ... why the state was not bound by its representation to
the court that the theory under which it was prosecuting the defendant was that the
living conditions in the defendant's apartment posed a risk to the mental health of
any child." (Emphasis in original). Id.
41 Id. at 717.
42 Based on the state's representations at trial, the Supreme Court concluded:
"the defendant was entitled to believe that, if the state did not meet its burden of
proving that theory beyond a reasonable doubt, she could not be convicted, regard-
less of whether the evidence would have supported a claim that Daniel's mental
health was endangered because he was particularly fragile. Thus, she was not on notice
that there was any need to raise doubts about that issue during trial." Id. at 718.
43 Id. at 719.
44 The court wrote: "the state was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant knew or should have known that the conditions would constitute
a risk of injury to the mental health of any child. Although the defendant reasonably
could have been aware that the conditions were not optimal, we are not persuaded
that the nature and severity of the risk were such that the defendant reasonably could
not have believed that they were within the acceptable range." Id. at 721.
45 Id. at 719. The court wrote: "The state has pointed to no statutes, published
or unpublished court opinions in this state or from other jurisdictions, newspaper
reports, television programs or other public information that would support a con-
clusion that the defendant should have known that the conditions in her apartment
posed an unlawful risk to the mental health of a child ... . We recognize that there
may be generally accepted housekeeping norms and that it may be common knowl-
edge that, all things being equal, a clean and orderly home is preferable to a dirty
and cluttered home. The same could be said of any number of conditions and actions
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
conditions in the defendant's home during the relevant peri-
od apparently had concluded that they were not so deplorable
as to pose an immediate threat to Daniel's mental health." 46
Declaring that DCF's own failure to protect the child was not
itself conclusive evidence that the living conditions in the
apartment posed no risk to a child's mental health, it did
establish "that the conditions in the apartment did not pose
such an obvious risk that it would be within the knowledge
of an ordinary person." 47  Evidence the child actually
involved had committed suicide was before the jury, but the
court concluded "that evidence was not competent to prove
that such harm was foreseeable." 48 The court found that the
defendant in Scruggs was not on notice that her conduct was
criminal and distinguished numerous other cases that upheld
risk of injury convictions based on conduct that was itself
criminal:
When a defendant knows that he is engaged in conduct that is
sufficiently dangerous to be criminalized, the defendant is on
notice that exposure to that conduct could injure a child's men-
tal health. In the present case, the state concedes that being
messy is not, in and of itself, unlawful, and points to no objec-
tive standards for determining the point at which housekeeping
becomes so poor that an ordinary person should know that it
poses an unacceptable risk to the mental health of a child.49
In Scruggs, Justice Borden concurred with the majority
opinion but wrote separately to emphasize several points:
that the "trial court should have applied the objective stan-
that affect a child's well-being .... Not all conduct that poses a risk to the mental
or physical health of a child is unlawful. Rather, there is an acceptable range of
risk." (Emphasis in original). Id. at 719-20. Later the court declared: "the state con-
cedes that being messy is not, in and of itself, unlawful, and points to no objective
standards for determining the point at which housekeeping becomes so poor that an
ordinary person should know that it poses an unacceptable risk to the mental health
of a child." Id. at 723-24.
46 Id. at 721.
47 Id. at 721.
48 Id. at 722. The court reasoned that "actual effects are not necessarily fore-
seeable effects." Id. Calling "the application of hindsight to be particularly trou-
bling in this context[,]" the court declared: "the state cannot decline to prosecute
persons who maintain such conditions because it believes that the risk to children
either is within an acceptable range or is speculative and then, only when cata-
strophic harm actually occurs, use that as evidence that the risk was unacceptable
and foreseeable." Id. at 722 n.10.
49 Id. at 723-24.
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the case presented "a close call" on constitutional notice; and
that DCF's recommendation to close its investigation, even if
an error by the department, "deprived the defendant of fair
notice" that her housekeeping exposed her to criminal liabil-
ity and "entitled her to rely on the department's implicit con-
clusion ... that her home was within an acceptable range of
cleanliness." 50
IV. SETTING THE BOUNDS FOR EVIDENTIARY REVIEW
UNDER THE CODE: STATE V. SAWYER
In State v. Sawyer,5 1 the Supreme Court by a 6-1 en banc
decision reversed the Appellate Court and ordered a new trial
for the defendant on charges of first degree sexual assault,
third degree sexual assault (2 counts), first degree burglary,
threatening and first degree reckless endangerment. The case
is interesting both for how the majority interpreted and
applied the Connecticut Code of Evidence and because the
majority opinion did not directly confront and resolve issues
raised in the case concerning judicial rule-making and the
court's pre-Code common-law authority to change
Connecticut evidence law. After initial argument and before
reargument en banc, the Sawyer court ordered supplemental
briefing of 4 issues: (1) whether uncharged misconduct evi-
dence offered under the common scheme exception may also
be used to prove identity; (2) whether the court should revis-
it its pre-Code holdings that viewed uncharged prior sexual
misconduct evidence "more liberally" than other misconduct
evidence; (3) whether the adoption of the Code removed or
left intact the court's common-law authority to make rules of
evidence; and (4) what standard reviewing courts should use
to determine whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is
harmless.5 2 The court resolved supplemental issues (1) and
(4), but the majority opinion dealt with issues (2) and (3) only
50 Id. at 726-28.
51 279 Conn. 331 (2006).
52 The four supplemental issues were: "(1) 'Should this court determine that, in
sexual assault cases, prior misconduct evidence admitted under the common scheme
exception is also admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator
of the assault on the victim?' (2) 'Should this court reconsider its holdings that, in
sexual assault cases, prior sexual misconduct is viewed more liberally than other
2007]
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by way of dicta in a tantalizing footnote.53
In the majority opinion written by Justice Zarella, the
court decided that uncharged misconduct evidence admitted
to prove common scheme may not do double duty to prove
identity. The court concluded also that prior holdings of the
court viewing the admission of sexual misconduct evidence
"more liberally than other types of misconduct should not be
disturbed" and declared it "unnecessary to address" whether
the court retains its pre-Code common-law authority to
change the rules of evidence. Finally, the court settled on a
single standard for determining whether evidentiary error is
harmless. Both Justice Borden and Justice Katz, in separate
opinions, faulted the majority for not reaching the third sup-
plemental issue addressing the measure of constraint placed
by the Code on courts in adjudicating evidentiary issues at
trial and on appeal. Both took the position that changes to
the existing evidence law may only be effected by the judges
of the Superior Court in an exercise of their "rule making"
function and with the guidance of its evidence code oversight
committee.54 Both took issue with the court's failure to
acknowledge that the court's common-law adjudicative
types of prior misconduct?' (3) 'To what extent, if any, is this court constrained by
the Code of Evidence from answering either question I or 2 by changing our exist-
ing law?' 4) 'What standards should this court adopt for "harmless error" review of
erroneous evidentiary rulings?"' (Citations omitted.) Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 331 n. 1.
53 Footnote 1 in Sawyer is appended to the listing of justices at the outset of the
printed decision, not to the text of the majority opinion. The note states the that it
is unnecessary to decide the third issue, whether the court has the authority to
change evidence law codified by the Code of Evidence, but adds: "[W]e acknowl-
edge that, since 2000, the year in which the Connecticut Code of Evidence was
adopted, the authority to change the rules of evidence lies with the judges of the
Superior Court in the discharge of their rule-making function. Of course, prior to
that date, changes to substantive evidentiary rules were accomplished by our courts
in the exercise of their common-law authority. To the extent that our evidentiary
rules may be deemed to implicate substantive rights, we believe that it is unclear
whether those rules properly are the subject of judicial rule making rather than the
subject of common-law adjudication. Because that question raises an issue on which
we did not request briefing by the parties, however, we leave it for another day."
(Emphasis added.) Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 331 n.1. Justice Katz and Justice Borden
both took issue with the majority's distinction between evidentiary rules subject to
judicial rule-making and evidentiary rules implicating "substantive rights" that may
still be subject of common-law adjudication. Id. at 364-66 (Katz, J.), 367-68
(Borden, J.).
54 Id. at 362-66 (Katz, J., concurring), 366-93 (Borden, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
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authority to change evidence law was wholly transferred to
the rule-making authority of the judges of the Superior Court
when the Code was adopted. 55
The two issues sidestepped by the full court in Sawyer are
before the court again this year, in State v. DeJesus,56 a case
on certification from the Appellate Court presenting the
issue: "'Does this court, or any court, have the authority in
light of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, to reconsider the
rule that the introductions [sic] of prior sexual misconduct of
the defendant in sexual assault cases, is viewed under a
relaxed standard?"' 5 7
The Sawyer court confronted and settled the last supple-
mental issue upon which it had ordered special briefing: what
is the standard for determining whether evidentiary error is
harmless. Over decades the court had articulated two differ-
ent standards, a "more probable than not" test and a "substan-
tial prejudice" test.5 8 The Sawyer court wrote: "We conclude
that there is no reason to perpetuate two competing formula-
55 Justice Katz in dicta declared: "were I free to do so, I would favor reconsid-
ering our holding in State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 60-61 (1994), wherein we held
that, in sexual assault cases, prior misconduct evidence may be viewed more liber-
ally." Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 362. Justice Katz noted, "I would rely on the reasons I
articulated in my dissents in State v. Kulmac, supra, 230 Conn. 86-88, and State v.
Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 679-87 (2003), for rejecting a more liberal standard of
admissibility." Id. at n. 1. Justice Borden noted that he disagreed with "Justice Katz's
suggestion that, were we free to do so, we should reconsider our holding in State v.
Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 60 (1994)." Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 367 n.1.
56 91 Conn. App. 47 (2005), cert. granted, 279 Conn. 912 (2006).
57 279 Conn. 912 (2006). In another Appellate Court case also now before the
Supreme Court, the Appellate Court wrote: "While we acknowledge the seemingly
contradictory nature of [State v.] Roswell[, 6 Conn. 446 (1827)] and § 8-3, we know
of no authority indicating that a decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court may be
overruled by the promulgation of rules of evidence. Rather, the overruling of
Roswell remains exclusively the province of that court." John M., 94 Conn. App.
667, 672 n.5, cert. granted, 278 Conn. 916 (2006).
58 The court phrased one standard: "It is well established that a defendant must
demonstrate harmful error by showing that 'it is more probable than not' that the
erroneous evidentiary ruling affected the result; or that the erroneous evidentiary rul-
ing 'would have been likely' to affect the result." (Citations omitted) ld. at 353.
Then the court set out the other standard: "This court also has declared that erro-
neous evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only upon a showing by the
defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. In the context of erroneous eviden-
tiary rulings, we have likened 'substantial prejudice' to error 'so prejudicial as to
undermine confidence in the fairness of the verdict."' (Citations omitted) 279 Conn.
at 353.
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tions of the standard. Accordingly, we now establish a single
workable standard for harmless error review of erroneous evi-
dentiary rulings in the context of criminal cases." 59  After
concluding that there is not a uniform standard either in the
federal system or among state courts, the Sawyer court adopt-
ed a standard derived from the United States Supreme Court
decision in Kotteakos v. United States.60 The court declared:
[T]he proper standard for determining whether an erroneous
evidentiary ruling is harmless should be whether the jury's
verdict was substantially swayed by the error. This is consis-
tent with the outcome determinative approach followed by
the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts
because it expressly requires the reviewing court to consider
the effect of the erroneous ruling on the jury's decision.
We also adopt the standard expressed in Kotteakos and fol-
lowed by the Second Circuit, namely, "fair assurance"as the
appropriate level of confidence for assessing whether the
erroneous ruling substantially affected the verdict.
Accordingly, we conclude that a nonconstitutional error is
harmless when "an appellate court has a fair assurance that
the error did not substantially affect the verdict."6 1
In Sawyer itself, the majority applied the new standard
to the erroneous admission of uncharged misconduct
evidence arid found it required reversal. 62  In State v.
59 Id. at 354.
60 The Sawyer court wrote: "In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.
Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946), the United States Supreme Court determined that
'[i]f, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence
the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand...
But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substan-
tially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were
not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the
result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the
error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the con-
viction cannot stand.' (Citation omitted.) Id., 764-65." Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 355.
61 (Citations omitted.) Sawyer, 279 Conn. at 357-58.
62 Justice Borden dissented from the majority's disposition of the case but
added a nuanced justification for the new standard: "I disagree with the majority's
application of the standard to the facts of the present case, and I conclude that any
error by the trial court was harmless. I write further to underscore why I think we
rightly abandon the prior standard, which required the defendant to establish that it
was more probable than not that the error resulted in the guilty verdict. The 'more
probable than not' standard suggests that if our appellate minds are in equipoise on
the question of the harm caused by a trial error, the error is deemed to be harmless
and the defendant has not carried his burden of establishing harm. Although it is, in
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Calabrese,63 the court explained what factors are relevant in
applying the "fair assurance" test 64 and ordered a new trial
where the trial court failed to admit in evidence a tape of the
complainant threatening the defendant. 65
Also in State v. Calabrese, the Supreme Court sent an
important signal concerning the use of the Code of Evidence
in Connecticut trial and appellate practice. In Calabrese, the
state argued that trial counsel's failure to cite the Code barred
review of his claim on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion in disallowing evidence admissible under Section
8-8 of the Code to impeach a hearsay declarant. The
Supreme Court ruled that review under Section 8-8 was
appropriate in the case but took pains to support that conclu-
sion, explaining that the "trial court's discussion of this issue
consumed more than fourteen pages of transcript" and "the
defendant clearly argued the policy and substance underlying
§ 8-8 at trial, and gave the trial court ample opportunity to
accept that argument." 66  Practitioners should heed the
implied warning in Calabrese: it might no longer be suffi-
cient, as it was in the pre-Code era, to make evidentiary argu-
ments based on case authority without making direct refer-
ence to applicable provisions in the Code of Evidence.
Preservation of evidentiary error for review in the new era
should include citation to any applicable rules and commen-
tary in Code because it, not decisional law, controls eviden-
tiary rulings of trial judges and review of those rulings on
appeal.
my view, a close question, I am persuaded that, if the defendant successfully brings
our minds to that point of equipoise, then we do not have a fair assurance that the
error did not substantially affect the verdict, and the defendant should be granted a
new trial. In other words, whether the error was serious enough to require a new trial
should, not, in my view, rest on such a finely honed knife's edge." Id. at 392-93.
63 279 Conn. 393 (2006).
64 Id. at 412 ("In reviewing the case, we consider a number of factors, namely,
the overall strength of the state's case, the impact of the improperly admitted or
excluded evidence on the trier of fact, whether the proffered evidence was cumula-
tive, and the presence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the point for
which the evidence was offered.").
65 Id. at 41 1-13.
66 279 Conn. at 392-93 n. 18 ("Although it would have been preferable for the
defendant to have cited § 8-8 to the trial court, the defendant's objection, 'while not
the most artful, sufficiently alerted both the trial court and the [state] to the precise
nature of the objection."' (Citations omitted.)).
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V. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AFTER CRAWFORD:
STATE V. KIRBY AND OTHER CASES
In 2006 the Connecticut Supreme and Appellate Courts
decided many cases involving challenges to the admissibility
of hearsay based on the United States Supreme Court's 2004
holding in Crawford v. Washington.6 7 In Crawford the court
uprooted confrontation clause doctrine and announced a new
paradigm for confrontation analysis:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consis-
tent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in
their development of hearsay law--as does [Ohio v.] Roberts,
and as would an approach that exempted such statements
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testi-
monial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment
demands what the common law required: unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination. We leave for anoth-
er day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
"testimonial." Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before
a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.
These are the modem practices with closest kinship to the
abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. 6 8
In his majority opinion in Crawford, Justice Scalia wrote:
"We acknowledge the Chief Justice's objection that our
refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case
will cause interim uncertainty."69  The precise contours of
the term "testimonial" have been the subject of myriad state
and federal court decisions in the 3 years since Crawford was
decided. 70 The Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington and
other courts interpreting Crawford have indicated that the
confrontation clause applies only to evidence that qualifies as
testimonial and that the confrontation clause is not implicat-
ed by the admission of nontestimonial hearsay.7 1 The line
67 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
68 (Emphasis added.) 541 U.S. at 68.
69 (Emphasis added.) Id. at 68 n. 10. Of the "interim uncertainty" Justice Scalia
remarked: "But it can hardly be any worse than the status quo." Id.
70 According to Shepards as of February 6, 2007, Crawford had been cited in
1474 state and federal reported cases.
71 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006); United States v.
Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 231-32, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26604 (2d Cir. 2006) (autopsy
reports that qualify under the business records exception necessarily have not been
prepared in anticipation of litigation, thus are not testimonial and do not implicate
the confrontation clause).
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demarcating testimonial hearsay whose admissibility is gov-
erned by the confrontation clause from nontestimonial
hearsay whose admissibility is governed by the rules of evi-
dence has now been starkly delineated. Nonetheless, some
courts have not limited constitutional review under the con-
frontation clause to testimonial hearsay.72
The Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Kirby73
addressed "whether various hearsay statements made by the
deceased complainant to a police dispatcher, a responding
police officer, and an emergency medical technician were
'testimonial' and, therefore, inadmissible as violative of the
confrontation guarantee of the sixth amendment to the United
States constitution as explained by Crawford v.
Washington."74  Justice Norcott wrote the unanimous opin-
ion of the court in Kirby, first holding that the challenged
hearsay statements had all been admissible under exceptions
to the hearsay rule set forth in the Connecticut Code of
Evidence 75 and, second, holding that the admission of the
statements to the dispatcher and the police officer had violat-
ed Crawford.76
The court held that the kidnapping victim's statements to
72 For example, in State v. Galarza, 97 Conn. App. 444, 449, cert. denied, 280
Conn. 936 (2006), the Appellate Court applied the constitutional harmless error rule
to the erroneous admission of hearsay-statements of a murder victim made to
another lay person several hours before he was killed: "Assuming without deciding
that the defendant was denied the right to cross-examine the witness, we conclude,
nonetheless, that the admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because there was sufficient other circumstantial evidence from which the
jury reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was responsible for the death of the victims." Id. at 449. Concurring in the result,
Judge Schaller emphasized that the admission of the hearsay evidence had violated
the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Id. at 474-78.
73 280 Conn. 361 (2006).
74 Id. at 363-64.
75 At oral argument, which this author attended, counsel for Kirby urged the
court to decide the case on evidentiary grounds, without reaching his constitutional
claims under Crawford. By contrast, in a second case argued the same morning in
the Supreme Court, defense counsel urged the court to reach out and decide his
Crawford claims first. See State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 413 (2006) (reversed
without reaching Crawford claims, viewed not "likely to arise on remand").
76 The court held that the challenged statements to the police dispatcher and
investigating officer were admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to
the hearsay rule, codified in Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-3(2). Id. at 376-77.
The defendant did not challenge the trial court's admission of the declarant's state-
ment to the medical technician under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay
rule. Id. at 372 n.11 (citing Conn. Code Evid. §8-3 (5)).
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the 911 operator and to the police constituted "testimonial"
statements that were inadmissible in the absence of an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the complainant. The court made use
of the "primary purpose" test7 7 set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington.7 8 Davis addressed
"the applicability of Crawford to more informal statements to
police dispatchers in the context of 911 calls, and to police
officers on the scene of a crime." 7 9 The Kirby court held that
the "primary purpose" of the complainant's phone call with a
police dispatcher was "to investigate and apprehend a suspect
from a prior crime, rather than to solve an ongoing emergency
or crime in progress at the time of the call." 80 Therefore the
statement was testimonial. Similarly, the statement to a
police officer was testimonial because it was part of a police
inquiry into what had already happened, not what was still
happening.81 Thus the admission of each statement violated
the confrontation clause, necessitating a new trial.
The Kirby court also held that the complainant's state-
ments to an emergency medical technician who attended to
her were not "testimonial" for confrontation purposes
because the statements were part of the medical technician's
"immediate response to and medical assessment of the com-
plainant at the scene." 82 The court applied the "third formu-
lation of testimonial statements under Crawford, namely,
'statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial .. '83
In deciding that the statements made during a medical exam-
ination were not testimonial, the court declared that "[t]he
77 Kirby, 280 Conn. at 381 ("'Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongo-
ing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."' (quoting Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006))).
78 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
79 Kirby, 280 Conn. at 381
80 Id. at 383-84.
81 Id. at 385-86.
82 Id. at 388.
83 Id. at 389 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 52).
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key to the inquiry is whether the examination and question-
ing were for a 'diagnostic purpose' and whether the 'state-
ment was the by-product of substantive medical activity."' 84
In State v. Slater,85 the Appellate Court reached the same
conclusion as Kirby in rejecting a Crawford challenge to a
complainant's statements to medical personnel in an emer-
gency room after she had been sexually assaulted at knife-
point.8 6 The more interesting issue raised in Slater was
whether Crawford applies at all to excited utterances made to
civilian bystanders. 87 Noting that one gloss on Crawford is
that such evidence admitted under the spontaneous utterance
exception never violates the confrontation clause, the Slater
court stated that it would "not rest our analysis on so narrow
a filament."8 8 Instead the court carefully analyzed "whether
the victim's spontaneous utterances in the present case are
testimonial, as that term is used in Crawford" and held that
they were not testimonial. 89 Similarly, in State v. Miller,90
the Appellate Court found a statement made by one layperson
to another was not testimonial hearsay under Crawford.9 1
The Miller opinion provides a helpful primer on the charac-
teristics of testimonial hearsay92 and a trove of federal and
state case law in support of its conclusion:
The statement at issue in the present case does not qualify as
either testimony at a preliminary hearing, testimony before a
84 Id. at 391 (quoting In re T.T, 351 I1. App. 3d 976, 992-93, 815 N.E.2d 789
(2004)).
85 State v. Slater, 98 Conn. App. 288, 301-07 (2006).
86 The court noted: "Her statements were made in an emergency room on the
heels of the hurt received and were made for the purpose of obtaining medical treat-.
ment." Id. at 307.
87 Id. at 294-301.
88 Id. at 297.
89 Id. at 299-300 (important under Davis v. Washington, the statement "lacked
any degree of 'formality' and also it did not fit into "'the core class' of testimonial
statements identified by Crawford").
90 95 Conn. App. 362, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 907 (2006).
91 The court also reviewed the statement under the pre-Crawford test for estab-
lishing adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation clause. Id. at 385-86.
Miller was decided in early 2006 before the Supreme Court decision in Davis v.
Washington indicated that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial evidence.
92 In an aside on the notion that admissible hearsay is not "testimonial" for con-
frontation purposes, the Miller court states: "Although it seems counterintuitive to
describe something that in most instances will be admitted as testimony in a court
of law as 'nontestimonial,' we use that established terminology." Id. at 381 n. 11.
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grand jury or testimony at a former trial, nor was it obtained
via police interrogation. Rather, it was the sort of remark to
an acquaintance that the Crawford court proclaimed to be
nontestimonial. The courts of this land, both federal and
state, are in agreement that statements made to friends in
unofficial settings do not constitute testimonial hearsay.93
There were a number of other cases raising confrontation
issues. In State v. Gregory C., 9 4 the Appellate Court reversed
the defendant's conviction of sexual assault in a spousal rela-
tionship at a bench trial at which the trial court barred the
defendant from cross-examining the defendant's spouse (who
by time of trial claimed that the intercourse had been con-
sensual) about the couple's sexual history. The defendant
claimed that evidence of their "sexual 'role-playing' was
relevant to whether the defendant used force on the night of
the incident.9 5 The Appellate Court held that the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation was violated, necessitat-
ing a new trial because the state could not establish "that the
exclusion of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 96
In State v. Skakel, the Supreme Court held that the con-
frontation clause was not violated by admission at the defen-
dant's murder trial of former testimony of a witness at the
probable cause hearing. The witness, now deceased, was
unavailable for cross-examination in front of the jury.97
Similarly, in State v. Estrella, the Supreme Court found that
the confrontation guarantee was satisfied where testimony of
93 (Citations omitted) 95 Conn. App. at 384.
94 94 Conn. App. 759 (2006).
95 Id. at 764-66.
96 Id. at 768. The court also found that a statement made by the complainant
15 hours after the incident should not have been admitted as an excited or sponta-
neous utterance because it was neither spontaneous nor unreflective, given the vic-
tim's "considerable time and opportunity to collect her thoughts and reflect on what
had occurred the night before." Id. at 772.
97 276 Conn. at 711-16. Noting that the evidence fell "squarely within
Crawford's core class of testimonial evidence" the Court rejected the defendant's
claim that the testimony was "inherently unreliable." Id. at 714-15. The court noted
that "Crawford makes clear that the opportunity for cross-examination satisfies the
requirements of the confrontation clause." Id. at 715. The Court found that standard
met because the defense counsel had had an opportunity to challenge the witness's
credibility at the probable cause hearing, the witness had testified "under oath and
was subject to penalty for perjury[,]" there was an accurate record of the hearing,
and the defendant had the same counsel at the hearing and at his later trial. Id. at 715.
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a witness at the defendant's probable cause hearing was
admitted as former testimony where the witness was unavail-
able because he invoked his right against self-incrimination
and thereby refused to testify.98 As the prior testimony was
indisputably "testimonial in nature," the issue boiled down to
whether the witness, a person named Rivers, was "unavail-
able at the time of trial" and whether the defendant "had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine him regarding the details
of his testimony."99 There was no dispute that Rivers was
"unavailable," so the sole issue was the adequacy of the defen-
dant's opportunity to cross-examine Rivers. Reviewing the
probable cause hearing transcript, the Court concluded that
"the defendant had a more than adequate and full opportunity
to cross-examine Rivers both generally and specifically to
address whether Rivers was giving truthful testimony." 0
The extra fillip in Estrella was that Rivers sent the defen-
dant a letter after the probable cause hearing in which he
"ostensibly retract[ed] that probable cause testimony."' 0 l
The Court entertained the claim that such after-acquired
impeachment evidencel 02 is relevant to a determination
whether the defendant was given an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine Rivers at the probable cause hearing but it
concluded that the additional impeachment evidence learned
after the hearing did not include significant facts unknown to
the defendant at the time of the hearing. 103 Declaring that the
majority's approach "makes what is a very simple question
into a needlessly complex one[,]" Justice Borden concurred
in the result but argued: "Contrary to the majority's assump-
tion of relevance of nonexistent evidence under Crawford, I
98 277 Conn. 458, 465-466 (2006).
99 Id. at 472.
100 Id. at 475.
101 Id. at 475.
102 The Court held that the defendant had a constitutional right to have the let-
ter admitted in evidence at trial, but that the trial court's refusal to admit the letter
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 477-79. Justice Borden agreed that
it should have been admitted but would have found it to be evidentiary error and
harmless. Id. at 495-96.
103 Id. at 476. Distinguishing cases in which newly learned impeachment evi-
dence was unknown before, the Court wrote: "Here, by contrast, the defendant knew
better than anyone else whether Rivers was lying about the defendant's conduct and
thus readily could have challenged his credibility even without the letter." Id.
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conclude that such evidence is simply irrelevant to a proper
Crawford analysis."' 104
VI. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In State v. Nash,10 5 the Supreme Court found that two
police officers had acted reasonably within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when they stopped, handcuffed and began
to patdown a suspect but then transported him to a nearby
police substation 30 seconds away to do a full patdown
because a crowd of 15-20 people had gathered around them
and the suspect had offered verbal resistance. Another officer
had viewed the suspect through a mounted street camera
engaging in apparent drug transactions with two different cus-
tomers and appearing to be selling small items that he stored
in a plastic bag in his left boot. The full patdown at the sub-
station produced a crinkling sound in the suspect's boot, lead-
ing to the discovery of 38 baggies of crack and $319 in cash.
The Supreme Court carefully considered and rejected the
defendant's claims that the state had relied solely on the gen-
erality that drug dealers are known to carry guns to justify the
patdown, 106 that the removal of the suspect to a nearby sub-
station exceeded the scope of a valid investigative detention,
and that the full patdown of the suspect at the substation was
unjustified because the suspect was handcuffed and had
already been partially frisked when stopped on the street. 107
In State v. Sulewski, 10 8 the Appellate Court rejected the
defendant's claim that the police violated the Fourth
104 Id. at 491. Showing genuine incredulity, Justice Borden wrote: "It is simply
inconceivable to me that we could conclude that evidence, that did not exist at the
time of the prior testimony could somehow retroactively make that testimony inad-
missible under the confrontation clause because the defendant did not have that evi-
dence available to him. Of course he did not, and could not." (Emphasis in original)
Id. at 493-94.
105 278 Conn. 620 (2006).
106 In another stop and frisk case, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's
claims that he had been frisked by police merely because of his presence in an area
known for drug activity and that the frisk exceeded constitutional bounds when the
police seized marijuana from his watch pocket after realizing immediately upon
frisking him that the hard object in his pocket was contraband. State v. Starks, 94
Conn. App. 325, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 918 (2006).
107 Id. at 624-48.
108 98 Conn. App. 762 (2006).
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Amendment when they briefly stopped a van owned by
American Home Patient, Inc. on the pretext that a similar
vehicle had been in a recent accident. The actual purpose in
making the stop was to ascertain the identity of the van's
driver because the police had reason to believe a person driv-
ing the van had sold an informant cocaine in a controlled buy
an hour and a half before the stop. The police later used the
identification information in establishing probable cause for
a search warrant. Judge Rogers for the court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the stop comported with the
Fourth Amendment because the police had reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the driver had committed a crime
and rejected the defendant's claim that the state constitution
requires a different conclusion.10 9
In State v. Dalzell,I0 a police officer followed the defen-
dant's car for a mile before stopping him for a seat belt vio-
lation. The defendant was not wearing sunglasses on a sunny
day, his eyes were contracted, his nose red, nostrils running,
and he appeared "'slow and lethargic"'; noticing a rolled up
dollar bill between the front seats, the officer "asked the
defendant if he had used narcotics," to which he replied,
"'No, and I'm not getting out of the vehicle, so start writing
me a ticket."'ll When the defendant again refused to exit the
car, the officer arrested him for driving while under the influ-
ence of drugs and searched the car, finding heroin. 1 12 The
defendant challenged the stop and the arrest on state consti-
tutional grounds. Judge Dupont for the court held that the
stop was justified and not pretextual under the state constitu-
tion, 113 but held that probable cause to arrest (and search inci-
dent thereto) was not established by "facts that do not point
any more in the direction of criminal behavior than in the
109 Id. at 773-77.
110 96 Conn. App. 515 (2006), cert. granted, 280 Conn. 914 (Issue in Supreme
Court is: "Did the Appellate Court properly reach the question whether the defen-
dant's arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs was
based on probable cause, and, if so, did it properly conclude that probable cause was
lacking?").
Il Il d. at 519-20.
112 Id. at 520.
113 Id. at 524-26.
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direction of entirely benign circumstances."'1 14
In State v. Gonzalez,]15 the Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's claim that he had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment that police violated when
he placed a call to a cell phone owned by a drug dealer and
made arrangements for a drug deal-unaware that the police
had seized the phone and were at the other end of the con-
versation. 116
VII. TRIAL PRACTICE: RAPE SHIELD LAW
The Supreme Court in State v. Ritrovato117 reversed the
Appellate Court and ordered a new trial on one count each of
second degree sexual assault and one count of risk of injury
to a child, but not on two drug charges and a second count of
risk of injury. The court held that the trial court misapplied
the rape shield law when it denied the defendant's statutory
right to impeach a "victim [who] has testified on direct exam-
ination as to his or her prior sexual conduct."'1 18 The court
found that it was unnecessary to decide the defendant's claim
that his constitutional right to present a defense had been vio-
lated because the evidentiary ruling was harmful error neces-
sitating retrial on the counts to which the evidence was rele-
vant. 119  Similarly, in State v. Smith, 120 the Supreme Court
affirmed the Appellate Court's order of a new trial on nine
sexual assault and risk of injury charges against a defendant
114 Id. at 530 n.12.
115 278 Conn. 341, 349-54 (2006) (state constitutional issue not reached
because independently raised only in reply brief, id. at 347 n.9).
116 The court held: "because the defendant spoke voluntarily with police and
made no effort to ascertain the identity of the person to whom he spoke, he lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his words spoken during his call to [the deal-
er's] cellular telephone." Id. at 353-54.
117 280 Conn. 36 (2006).
118 CoNN. GEN. STAT. §54-86f(2).
119 Ritrovato, 280 Conn. at 50. The court applied its new "fair assurance" test
for harmless evidentiary error in concluding that the defendant had met "his burden
of proving that the evidentiary error was harmful with respect to the sexual assault
charges because, upon consideration of the entire record, we do not have a fair assur-
ance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict." Id. at 58. See id. at 56-
57 (citing "fair assurance" standard announced in State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331,
357 (2006)). See also State v. Smith, 280 Conn. 298, 307-10 (2006) (applying
Sawyer test to different rape shield issue).
120 280 Conn. 285 (2006).
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whose defense was misidentification and whose proffered
DNA evidence regarding semen found on the victim in sup-
port of that defense should have been admitted without limi-
tation under subdivision (1) of the rape shield statute. 12 1 The
Smith opinion contains a useful discussion of the "two step
process" necessary to determine the admissibility of evidence
proffered by a defendant under one of the exceptions to the
rule of exclusion set forth in the rape shield statute.1 2 2
In State v. Tutson, the Supreme Court reversed the
Appellate Court and sustained the state's arguments that the
trial court had properly found the defendant to have violated
the alibi notice requirement in the rules of practice and that
the trial court had properly excluded an alibi witness's testi-
mony as a sanction for the defendant's noncompliance with
the rules. 123
VIII. TRIAL PRACTICE: COUNSEL ISSUES
In State v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that deprivation
of the right to counsel at a probable cause hearing is not a
"structural error" necessitating automatic reversal but instead
constitutes "procedural error subject to harmless error
review." 124 In State v. Flanagan, the Appellate Court sus-
tained the state's arguments that a defendant's mid-trial invo-
cation of his constitutional right to self-representation was
neither a clear and unequivocal invocation of that right nor a
timely invocation so as to necessitate a full canvas of the
defendant by the trial court in the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances. 125 Judge Flynn dissented in Flanagan, arguing
121 CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-86f(l) contains an exception to its presumptive rule
of inadmissibility where "evidence is (1) offered by the defendant on the issue of
whether the defendant was, with respect to the victim, the source of semen, disease,
pregnancy or injury..... As in Ritrovato, the Smith Court noted that its holding on
evidentiary grounds made it unnecessary to determine whether the defendant's con-
stitutional right to present a defense had been violated. Smith, 280 Conn. at 295 n.6.
122 State v. Smith, 280 Conn. at 295-98. The defendant personally aided his
own cause when he expanded his counsel's offer of proof on relevance by exclaim-
ing, "'I'm not trying to have no rape hearing. I'm trying to prove that I ain't did
nothing to this young lady. That's it. I don't care about no hearing."' (Emphasis sup-
plied by court.) Id. at 293 (defense counsel had incorrectly claimed DNA evidence
of victim's sexual encounters with others was relevant to impeach her credibility).
123 278 Conn. 715, 730-46 (2006).
124 279 Conn. 493, 504, 509-10 (2006).
125 93 Conn. App. 458, 471-79 (2006).
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that the majority misconstrued both Practice Book Section
44-3 which guarantees the right of self-representation "at any
stage of the proceedings" and Article First, Section 8 of the
state constitution, which guarantees an accused in a criminal
prosecution "the right to be heard by himself . *..."126 In
another case, State v. Caracoglia,127 the Appellate Court
rejected a claim that the trial court had violated the defen-
dant's right to the assistance of counsel by accepting his
waiver of the right to counsel without an adequate canvas and
by permitting him to represent himself at trial. 128
In State v. Rodriquez, the Appellate Court rejected the
defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his trial counsel's motion to withdraw filed a day
before jury selection began and further found that the court
had made a sufficient inquiry of counsel and the defendant as
to the grounds for the motion, which was the defendant's
"assertion" that the defendant had recently filed a grievance
against his counsel a week previously.129 In State v. Sam, the
Appellate Court ordered a new trial where at the start of a
joint trial the trial court conducted an in-chambers inquiry
into defense counsel's co-representation of the defendant and
his brother and reached a resolution under which the court
severed the cases and ordered counsel to withdraw from rep-
resentation of one brother but not the other. 130 Applying the
holding of State v. Lopez, 131 the Sam court "agree[d] with the
defendant that the court improperly deprived him of the right
to be present at a critical stage of his prosecution and that the
deprivation amounted to a structural error warranting reversal
of his conviction." 132
126 Id. at 484-85.
127 95 Conn. App. 95, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 922 (2006).
128 Id. at 98-114. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he was not
competent to waive his right to counsel in October, 2003, because he had been found
not competent to stand trial in December, 2001, after which he was found to have
been. restored to competence by February, 2002. Id. at 99-100, 105-09.
129 93 Conn. App. 739, 743-48, cert. granted, 277 Conn. 930 (2006) (Issue cer-
tified: "Whether the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's decision
denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw?").
130 98 Conn. App. 13, 17-31, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944 (2006). A disclosure
is in order: this author served as the defendant's special public defender on appeal.
131 State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 (2004).
132 98 Conn. App. at 17.
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In Small v. Commissioner, the Appellate Court reached
and rejected the merits of an appeal from denial of a habeas
corpus petition in which the petitioner claimed that his trial
and appellate lawyers had rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to claim error in a jury instruction on
felony murder involving an attempted robbery where the
instruction omitted any instruction on the law of attempt.13 3
Judge Dupont for the majority first concluded that the
habeas court had abused its discretion in denying the petition
for certification to take an appeal because the issues raised
were "debatable among jurists of reason[,]" because "[n]o
appellate case has decided those precise issues" and
"because the appellate panel in this case does not agree on
the answers." 134  Agreeing that the claim was appealable,
Judge Harper dissented from the majority holding that relief
was not warranted, concluding instead that the petitioner had
been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on
appeal. 135
Again this year there was a plethora of cases involving
challenges to the conduct of counsel for the state. In recent
years the reviewing courts have taken claims of prosecutorial
misconduct much more seriously than in the 1990s when such
claims not only met with little to no success, but also were
often reviewed and rejected in a conclusory fashion without
careful analysis of the rules governing prosecutorial conduct
in criminal cases and the factors that determine whether a
defendant's right to a fair trial by jury has been undermined.
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are now accorded careful
133 98 Conn. App. 389 (2006), cert. granted, 281 Conn. 902 (2007).
134 Id. at 391-92. Judge Dupont concluded that issues raised in the case
"deserved encouragement to proceed further, and the petition for certification should
have been granted so that these questions could be answered." Id. On the merits,
however, Judge Dupont concluded that "[tlhe flaw in the petitioner's statement of
the issue is that he was not charged with the predicate crime of attempt to commit
robbery pursuant to §53a-49(a)(2)." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 395.
135 Id. at 402-09. Judge Harper found that the felony murder instruction should
have contained an instruction on attempt, that counsel's failure to challenge the
instruction was not in the range of sound trial strategy, and that "the court's omis-
sion of an instruction defining attempt prejudiced the petitioner." Id. at 407-09. The
Supreme Court has granted an appeal on the general issue: "Did the Appellate Court
properly determine that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel
at trial and on appeal?" Small, 281 Conn. 902 (2007).
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review even if not preserved by trial counsel. 136
While the established standard for reviewing claims of
prosecutorial misconduct is followed in every case, 137 its
application to the particulars of a case has often lead to dif-
ferent results in different courts in the same case. For exam-
ple, in both State v. Warholic and State v. Rowe, the Supreme
Court reversed Appellate Court holdings that prosecutorial
misconduct had undermined the fairness of the trials under
review. 138  In many cases the courts have closely dissected
and evaluated the claims of misconduct, sent useful signals
concerning the parameters of acceptable advocacy by the
prosecution, and then carefully determined the discrete ques-
tion of prejudice, usually concluding that the right to a fair
trial has not been violated. 139 The recent cases have typically
136 There is no longer a requirement that appellate counsel apply the specific
four-pronged Golding analysis in raising unpreserved claims of prosecutorial mis-
conduct State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572-76 (2004) (cited, e.g., in State v.
Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 742-44 (2006)). However, the lack of preservation is fac-
tored into a reviewing court's calculus of the nature and extent of the harm stemming
from misconduct that is established by the record. State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354,
360-61 (2006).
137 See, e.g., State v. Singleton, 95 Conn. App. 492, 499-505 (improprieties in
summation did not require new trial; court applied factors set forth in State v.
Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540 (1987): "'extent to which the misconduct was invit-
ed by-defense conduct or argument ... the severity of the misconduct ... the fre-
quency of the misconduct ... the centrality of the misconduct to the critical issues
in the case ... the strength of the curative measures adopted . . . and the strength of
the state's case."'), cert denied, 279 Conn. 904 (2006). In dissent in State v. Quint,
97 Conn. App. 72, 95-119 (2006), Judge Schaller provides a thorough review of the
"standards of review and principles of law" governing review of prosecutorial mis-
conduct claims and observes: "Even when those standards and principles are accu-
rately interpreted and precisely applied however, because they are fact specific, they
may appear to produce inconsistent results." Id. at 96.
138 State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354, 362-404 (2006) (despite various instances
of misconduct on cross-examination and at final argument Supreme Court agreed
with state's position that the Appellate Court "overstated the frequency and severity
of the misconduct, and failed to give adequate weight to the trial court's curative
instructions"; id. at 360, 404); State v. Rowe, 279 Conn. 139, 144-62 (2006)
(Supreme Court disagreed with Appellate Court's characterization of prosecutor's
arguments as improper comment on the evidence and on the defendant's failure to
testify).
139 See, e.g., State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 426-46 (2006) ("the defendant
claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing arguments by:
(1) bolstering his own credibility; (2) impugning defense counsel; and (3) express-
ing his personal belief in the strength of the state's case- and the credibility of the
state's witnesses. Although we conclude that one of the prosecutor's remarks con-
stituted misconduct, we disagree with the defendant's claim that this misconduct
deprived him of a fair trial." (Emphasis added.) id. at 426).
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involved claims of discovery violations, 14 0 improper examina-
tion of witnesses, 14 1 and improper summations to the jury. 142
IX. TRIAL PRACTICE: PROOF AND INSTRUCTION
ON ELEMENTS OF OFFENSES AND DEFENSES
Most challenges to time-tested parts of jury instructions
fail, even when the challenged instruction may not commu-
nicate as effectively with lay jurors as might be desirable. 143
Last year the Appellate Court rejected various challenges to
140 See, e.g., State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. at 694-707 (no Brady violation where
state did not provide defense with composite drawing of suspect until after verdict;
drawing not available via "open file" policy but defense counsel had reports that
made reference to the drawing and could have requested it specifically); State v.
Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 710-23 (2006) (trial record augmented on appeal, to show
state violated Brady by not disclosing that a witness stood to benefit at sentencing.
from plea agreement under which his trial testimony would be taken into consider-
ation; id. at 711-16; independent review of "materiality" of nondisclosure conclud-
ed it did not undermine confidence in fairness of trial and jury verdict; id. at 718-
23); State v. Bermudez, 94 Conn. App. 155, 157-60, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 933
(2006) (state's disclosure of co-defendant's statement during trial violated rule of
practice but did not prejudice defendant).
141 See, e.g., State v. Bermudez, 94 Conn. App. at 161 (four questions on cross-
examination of defendant about other witnesses's testimony improper but questions
"too few in number" and impropriety "not severe enough to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial."); State v. Singleton, 95 Conn. App. 492, 496-98, cert. denied, 279
Conn. 904 (2006) (defendant improperly cross-examined on state's witnesses verac-
ity but not violation of right to fair trial).
142 See, e.g., State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. at 742-772 (multiple claims of improp-
er argument rejected; reference to defendant as "spoiled brat" was "arguably injudi-
cious" but not due process violation; reference to defendant as a "killer" not improp-
er in context; use of audiovisual evidence in rebuttal summation not improper); State
v. Alvarez, 95 Conn. App. 539, 550-55, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910 (2006) (per
Williams factors calling defendant "junkie" was improper but not violation of right
to fair trial); State v. McCleese, 94 Conn. App. 521, 519-21, cert. denied, 278 Conn.
908 (2006) (improper argument using facts not in evidence about an arrest warrant
and probable cause finding did not deprive defendant of fair trial); State v. Griffin,
97 Conn. App. 169, 176-77, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 925 (2006) (calling victim a
"nice girl" and "nice lady" and once calling the defendant a "con man" not up to
"level of prosecutorial misconduct").
143 That is not to say that courts do not review such challenges carefully on
appeal. But many such challenges are raised for the first time on appeal, thereby
restricting the legal issue to the sheer juristic accuracy of the instruction and not the
advisibility and communicative efficacy of the particular instruction in guiding the
jury on fundamental constitutional principles. A recent Second Circuit decision is
notable for its concern that even well-founded jury instructions may prejudice a
defendant's right to the presumption of innocence: "This principle leads us to
denounce any instruction, including the one at issue here, that tells a jury that a tes-
tifying defendant's interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify
falsely. We do so not because the instruction is necessarily inaccurate, either gener-
ally or as applied to [the defendant]." United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 246
(2d. Cir. 2006).
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the standard jury charge on the reasonable doubt standard' 44
but did find error in a case (now on appeal to the Supreme
Court) in which the trial court's instruction went off the beat-
en track in an effort to improve upon the "standard charge
'routinely' upheld by our Supreme Court." 145
In State v. Montanez, the Supreme Court held that it was
error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on self-
defense even though the defendant did not request such an
instruction at trial where the defendant was prosecuted as an
accessory to two counts of first degree manslaughter with a
firearm and one count of first degree assault committed by a
cohort who may have been justified in his use of force. 146
The case contains an illuminating discussion of the "inter-
play" between "two complex doctrines, justification defenses
and accessorial liability."147 In State v. Miller, the Appellate
Court rejected the defendant's claim that the state must prove
that a person charged as an accessory to manslaughter in the
first degree with a firearm intended the use of a firearm. 148
The court includes close analysis of past Supreme Court
cases that grappled with and rejected the proposition that the
dual intent requirement of the accessory statute, Section 53a-
8, converts into a "tripartite intent requirement" 149 when the
criminal offense charged contains an "'aggravating circum-
stance that itself does not require proof of any particular
mental state."' 1 50
Connecticut courts continue to clarify the nature of
144 State v. Alexander, 95 Conn. App. 154, 160-61, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 909
(2006) (instruction that "'proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond all reasonable doubt"' was an isolated inaccuracy that could not have mis-
led jury); State v. LaSalle, 95 Conn. App. 263, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 908 (2006)
(instruction that reasonable doubt must be a "real doubt" and "an honest doubt" did
not dilute constitutional standard). See also State v. Smith, 94 Conn. App. 188, 198-
202, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 906 (2006) (instruction to "'harmonize the evidence as
far as it reasonably can be done"' did not lower state's burden of proof).
145 State v. Jackson, 93 Conn. 671, 678, cert. granted, 278 Conn. 902 (2006).
146 277 Conn. 735, 749-64 (2006).
147 Id. at 751.
148 95 Conn. App. 362, 371-77 (2006).
149 Id. at 372 (discussing Justice Shea's concurrence in State v. McCalpine, 190
Conn. 822, 833-835 (1983).
150 Id. at 372-74 (quoting Chief Justice Peters's opinion for the court in State v.
Crosswell, 223 Conn. 243, 258 n.l 1 (1992)).
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"Pinkerton"15 1 liability under state law. In State v.
Martinez,152 the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's con-
viction of conspiracy to commit murder but ordered a new
trial on attempted murder, assault, and kidnapping charges
where the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the
defendant guilty of the latter three charges under principal,
accessorial, or Pinkerton theories of liability without the
jury's reaching unanimity as to its theory of liability. The
Martinez opinion contains a very useful review of
Connecticut Pinkerton case law and the distinction between
Pinkerton "vicarious liability" and accessorial liability under
General Statutes Section 53a-8.153 The court concludes that it
is "abundantly clear that accessory liability and coconspirator
liability, although both relate to vicarious liability principles
generally, are conceptually distinct ways to commit a
crime." 15 4 In State v. Leggett,155 the Appellate Court rejected
various challenges to sufficiency of the evidence to prove con-
spiracy to commit second degree robbery and two counts of
second degree robbery, as well as challenges to the jury
charge on Pinkerton liability. In State v. Martin,156 now on
appeal in the Supreme Court, Judge Schaller relied on
Pinkerton principles in his dissent from the majority's con-
clusion that the evidence was insufficient to support convic-
tion of conspiracy to possess one kilogram or more of mari-
juana and of two possessory offenses because there was no
direct proof that the defendant knew that a package contained
eighteen pounds of marijuana where he and cohorts picked up
the package in Middletown and transported it to Bridgeport in
a two-car caravan. 157
151 Our Supreme Court explains: "In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1946), 'the United States Supreme Court held that a conspirator may be
held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the
scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a
necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.' State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32,
43 (1993)." State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 604 n.14 (2006).
152 278 Conn. 598 (2006).
153 Id. at 611-18. It is settled that a jury does not have to be unanimous as to
whether a defendant is guilty as a principal or accessory. Id. at 605 (citing State v.
Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 348 (1997)).
154 (Emphasis added.) Id. at 618.
155 94 Conn. App. 392, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 911 (2006).
156 98 Conn. App. 458, cert. granted, 281 Conn. 901 (2007).
157 Id. at 473-92.
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In State v. Hardy,158 the Supreme Court rejected the claim
that a gun constitutes a "deadly weapon" as defined in the
Penal Code only if it is a "firearm" that uses gunpowder as a
propellant and the court held that an operable pellet gun is a
"deadly weapon" because it is "designed for violence" and
"capable of causing death or serious physical injury."'159 In
State v. Flowers,160 the Supreme Court held that the defen-
dant was entitled to a new trial on burglary in the first degree
because it was reasonable possible that the jury convicted the
defendant in reliance on a jury charge authorizing conviction
of an uncognizable theory of burglary, namely "that the
defendant unlawfully entered the building with the intent to
commit an attempted assault[.] ' 16 1
The Appellate Court reversed convictions in a number of
cases that are now before the Supreme Court for further
review. In State v. John M., 162 the court found two discrete
bases for reversing the defendant's conviction of sexual
assault in the second degree for having intercourse with his
stepdaughter. First, the court held that the defendant's admis-
sion that he was married to the victim's mother and the vic-
tim's testimony that the defendant's wife was her mother con-
stituted insufficient proof that the victim was the defendant's
stepdaughter.163 Second, 164 the court held that General
158 278 Conn. 113, 131-33 (2006).
159 Dissenting, Justice Katz disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the evi-
dence had established that the pellet gun in issue was "capable of causing death or
serious physical injury." Id. at 137. In an interesting concurring opinion, Justice
Borden disagreed "with both the majority and the dissent in their heavy emphasis on
the reference in the commentary to the Penal Code (commentary) to a 'deadly
weapon' as requiring an inquiry into whether a particular weapon is 'designed for
violence."' Id. at 134. Justice Borden noted the "irony" that he himself had been
"heavily involved in drafting both the Penal Code and its commentary" in his capac-
ity as the executive director of the commission to revise the Penal Code from 1963
to 1971. Id. at 134 n.2.
160 278 Conn. 533 (2006).
161 (Emphasis added.) Id. at 547. In dissent, Justice Zarella argued that it was
not reasonably possible that the jury relied on the trial court's improper instruction.
Id. at 551-56.
162 94 Conn. App. 667, cert. granted, 278 Conn. 916 (2006).
163 The court relied on an early nineteenth century Supreme Court case, State v.
Roswell, 6 Conn. 446 (1827), which held that a defendant's admission of his mar-
riage to the mother of the victim in an incest case was both inadmissible and insuf-
ficient to prove kinship between the defendant and the victim. The Appellate Court
acknowledged that the Roswell rule is inconsistent with the Code of Evidence, §8-
3(l)(A) and other modern authority: "While we acknowledge the seemingly contra-
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Statutes Section 53a-72a(a)(2) violates the equal protection
clause because it proscribes heterosexual but not homosexual
intercourse between kindred persons.165 In State v. Winot, 16 6
the court reversed two of the defendant's three convictions,
finding the second degree kidnapping statute, General
Statutes Section 53a-94(a), was vague as applied to the facts
of the case relating to "restraint" 167 and that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction of risk of injury to a child
under the portion of Gen. Stat. §53-21(a)(1) that prohibits
"'injurious acts directly perpetrated on the child."'168
In State v. Silva,16 9 the court reversed two convictions of
interfering with an officer, one count based on the defen-
dant's use of profane speech when the police requested
license, insurance and registration information during a
motor vehicle stop for unsafe backing in making a three-
point turn and the second count based on her countermanding
dictory nature of Roswell and §8-3, we know of no authority indicating that a deci-
sion of the Connecticut Supreme Court may be overruled by the promulgation of
rules of evidence. Rather, the overruling of Roswell remains exclusively the
province of that court." State v. John M., 94 Conn. App. at 672 n.5. That John M.
was decided before State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331 n.1 (2006), may help explain the
Appellate Court's view that Roswell is good law despite its inconsistency with the
Code of Evidence. It is interesting that Roswell itself was a 3-2 decision in which
the dissent wrote that "upon the general principles of evidence, an acknowledgment
of the fact of marriage seems admissible to prove that fact against the defendant."
Roswell, 6 Conn. at 453.
164 Concurring on the insufficiency issue, Judge Schaller declared that it was
improper to reach the equal protection issue: "our obligation is clearly to avoid
unnecessary constitutional adjudication." Id. at 695. The Supreme Court has certi-
fied both issues for appeal.
165 Id. at 674-95.
166 95 Conn. App. 332, cert. granted in part, 279 Conn. 905 (2006) (on whether
CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-94 is unconstitutional on facts of case).
167 Id. at 343 ("the evidence reveals that the only restraint imposed on the vic-
tim was the defendant's forcibly taking the victim's arm and pulling on it for a few
seconds. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence of the movement and confine-
ment in this case falls into the realm of the 'minuscule' movement or duration of
confinement. To hold that the defendant was put on notice that this conduct would
violate the kidnapping statute, § 53a-94 (a), would be an absurd and unconscionable
result."). The successful appellate lawyer in Winot was not successful in making a
similar vagueness-as-applied challenge to the first degree kidnapping statute in State
v. Sanseverino, 98 Conn. App. 198, 209-213, cert. granted, 280 Conn. 946 (2006),
but the court reversed on other grounds and the Supreme Court has granted the
defendant's petition to appeal on the vagueness issue (as well as the state's petition
to appeal a prejudicial joinder issue).
168 Id. at 359 (quoting State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 148 (2005)).
169 93 Conn. App. 349, cert. granted, 277 Conn. 931 (2006) (as applied issue
certified for appeal).
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police orders to stay at the scene later on. 170 In State v.
Khadijah,7 1 the court held that the state's evidence of wilful-
ness was insufficient to support a failure to appear conviction
where the defendant arrived for a 10:45 a.m. court appear-
ance at 11:30 a.m. Her attorney called her from the court-
house to wake her up from her couch where she had dozed at
8 a.m. upon her return from her all-night job. 172
X. JURY ISSUES
In State v. James p.,173 the Appellate Court held that the
defendant was entitled to a new trial where the trial court
refused to recall the jury from the jury room to be polled indi-
vidually on its verdict after the court had accepted the verdict
but not yet discharged the jury. A rule of automatic reversal
applies where a request for polling is "timely." The court
found the request still timely where the record showed that
the court had put off excusing the jury so that it could "spend
a couple of minutes with you in the jury deliberation
room." 174  Judicial communications with jurors after trial
played a different role in State v. Durant,175 where the trial
judge spoke with the jury after its discharge and the judge
later presided, without objection from counsel, over the
defendant's violation of probation hearing based on the con-
duct in issue at the trial. The judge informed counsel of his
discussion with the jury about the trial evidence and stated it
would not consider anything "'imparted to this court in that
ex parte discussion."' 176 Because both parties consented in
170 The Appellate Court concluded that the "first responsibility" of the police at
the scene had been to procure medical assistance for victims of a car accident that
occurred before the defendant's arrival and that the defendant herself was fulfilling
the police obligation for them when she left the scene after informing them that she
was taking her injured brother to a hospital. Id. at 359-60.
171 98 Conn. App. 409 (2006), cert. granted, 281 Conn. 901 (2007).
172 Id. at 418-19 ("Working late the night before a court appearance, pursuant
to a regularly kept work schedule, failing to set an alarm clock or asking a friend to
awaken her from a potentially inadvertent doze does not amount to purposefully and
intentionally absenting oneself from the courthouse. At best, the state's first two
offered pieces of evidence would support a finding of negligent, not purposeful,
absence from court." (Emphasis in original)).
173 96 Conn. App. 93, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 910 (2006).
174 (Emphasis added in opinion.) Id. at 99.
175 94 Conn. App. 219, 229-33 aff'd, 281 Conn. 548, 2007 Conn. LEXIS 78
(March 6, 2007) (per curiarn affirmance of other issue).
176 Id. at 231.
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open court to have the trial judge continue to preside at the
hearing, the court found no error.177
The Appellate Court reviewed various claims relating to
severance and consolidation. The court rejected challenges
to the consolidated trial of three separate informations
against the defendant in State v. Davis178 and two informa-
tions in State v. Santaniello,179 but sustained a defendant's
claim that charges against him should have been severed and
tried separately in State v. Sanseverino.180  The Supreme
Court has granted review in both Davis and Sanseverino.
XI. IMMIGRATION
The severe immigration consequences of a criminal con-
viction make it unsurprising that there has been a recent
increase in post-conviction efforts to challenge state convic-
tions in order to avoid deportation. In State v. Reid,181 the
Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction to consider
an untimely appeal by a defendant who pleaded guilty to sec-
ond degree assault in 1997 and received a sentence concur-
rent with a longer sentence for a much more serious offense.
In May, 2003, DNA evidence exonerated the defendant on
the more serious offense. Nonetheless he was deported in
June, 2003 based on the assault conviction. Lawyers for Reid
then made an unsuccessful challenge in the trial court to the
adequacy of the original plea to assault. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction even to con-
sider his challenge 82 but that under the "rare circumstances"
of the case the Supreme Court would exercise its "superviso-
ry powers to treat the defendant's appeal as though he had
filed a request for permission to file an untimely appeal from
his judgment of conviction." 183 While the court denied
177 Id. at 233.
178 98 Conn. App. 608 (2006), cert. granted, 281 Conn. 915 (2007). The court
also rejected challenges to the joinder for a single trial of co-defendants in State v.
[W.] Madore, 96 Conn. App. 235, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 907 (2006), and State v.
[R.] Madore, 96 Conn. App. 27 1, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 907 (2006).
179 96 Conn. App. 646, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 920 (2006).
180 98 Conn. App. 198, cert. granted, 280 Conn. 946 (2006).
181 277 Conn. 764 (2006).
182 Id. at 776 ("trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion
to withdraw rendered void its denial of that motion.").
183 Id. at 778.
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Reid's appeal on the merits, the case establishes a procedur-
al path for other individuals facing deportation who cannot
otherwise obtain review of constitutional infirmities in their
criminal convictions. 184
In Ajadi v. Commissioner,185 the Supreme Court held that
a petitioner facing deportation who was no longer serving a
sentence for a criminal conviction could not bring a habeas
action to challenge the conviction because the state habeas
statute requires "custody." 186 The court noted that the peti-
tioner did not challenge the proposition that deportation is a
"collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction. 187 The
court also rejected the defendant's argument, first made on
appeal, that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be
treated as a writ of error coram nobis.188
184 Justice Norcott concurred in the result but called it "ill-advised" of the court
to invoke its supervisory authority in order to hear an appeal overdue by seven years.
Id. at 800.
185 280 Conn 514 (2006).
186 Id. at 536-48.
187 In dicta the Ajadi court noted that most jurisdictions still consider deporta-
tion a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction despite changes in federal law
eliminating discretionary sources of relief from deportation. Id. at 539 n.28. In Reid,
the court had noted that defendant could not bring a habeas corpus action because he
was no longer in custody under the criminal judgment that he sought to vacate. Reid,
277 Conn. at 779 n.17. However, Justice Norcott in his concurrence in Reid had
noted that the Second Circuit permits a deportee to file a federal habeas petition. Id.
at 799-800 n.14 (citing Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2004)).
188 Ajadi, 280 Conn. at 548-50. See State v. Jweinat, 2006 Conn. Super LEXIS
2125 (Scheinblum, J., granted writ of coram nobis). Defendants may also move to
vacate a judgment within three years of a plea "[i]f the court fails to address the
defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possi-
ble [deportation, exclusion and denial] consequences of the defendant's plea, as
required in subsection (a) of this section [CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-lj]." See, e.g., State
v. Hu, 2005 Conn. Super LEXIS 3283 (Sequino, J., granted §54-1j motion). In State
v. Aquino, 279 Conn. 293 (2006), the Supreme Court dismissed as moot an appeal
from a motion to vacate a guilty plea where the defendant had already been deport-
ed and had not established that the conviction he sought to vacate was the "sole rea-
son for his deportation." Id. at 298 n.2.
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